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Faculty and Deans

THE iPHONE MEETS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
*

Adam M. Gershowitz

Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, police may search the entire body
and immediate grabbing space of an arrestee, including the contents of all containers, without any probable cause. Because almost all traffic infractions are
arrestable offenses, police have enormous opportunity to conduct such searches
incident to arrest. In the near future, these already high-stakes searches will become
even more important because millions of drivers will not only possess containers
that hold a few scattered papers, such as wallets or briefcases, but also
iPhones—capable of holding tens of thousands of pages of personal information.
If current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is extended to its logical conclusion,
officers who arrest drivers for traffic infractions will be permitted to search the call
histories, text messages, email, photos, movies, and internet browsing history on
iPhones with no suspicion of wrongdoing whatsoever. This Article demonstrates
how the full contents and multiple applications of iPhones can be searched without
a warrant or probable cause under existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
The Article also offers approaches courts and legislatures might adopt to ensure
greater protection for the soon-to-be pervasive iPhone devices. Courts and
legislatures can attempt to minimize this invasion of privacy by changing the legal
rules to require that searches be related to the purpose of the arrest, by limiting
searches to applications that are already open, by restricting suspicionless investigation to a small number of discrete steps, or by limiting searches to data already
downloaded onto the iPhone, rather than data that is merely accessible through the
iPhone’s internet connection.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that Defendant Dan is stopped by the police for driving through
a stop sign. The officer thinks that Dan looks suspicious, but has no probable
cause to believe Dan has done anything illegal, other than driving recklessly.
Because running a stop sign is an arrestable offense and the officer is suspicious
that Dan might be involved in more serious criminal activity, the officer
arrests Dan for the traffic violation.
Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, officers are entitled to
search the body of the arrestee to ensure that he does not have weapons and
to prevent him from destroying evidence. The search incident to arrest is
automatic and allows officers to open containers found on the person, even
when there is no probable cause to believe anything illegal is inside. For
instance, a standard search incident to arrest often turns up drugs located in a
small container such as a cigarette pack. Yet, Dan does not have a cigarette
pack in his pocket; instead, like millions of other technophiles, Dan is
carrying an iPhone.
The officer removes the iPhone from Dan’s pocket and begins to rummage through Dan’s cell phone contacts, call history, emails, pictures, movies,
and, perhaps most significantly, his internet browsing history. Thus, in
addition to finding Dan’s personal financial data and embarrassing personal
information, the police also discover incriminating pictures of stolen
contraband, emails evidencing drug transactions, and internet surfing
of websites containing child pornography. Is all of this evidence admissible even
though Dan has only been arrested for a traffic infraction and there
was no probable cause (not to mention no warrant) to search the contents of
his iPhone? When one considers the breadth of information located in
Dan’s iPhone, it would seem shocking that officers need no suspicion
whatsoever in order to search through that information. Yet, that result
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appears to follow from longstanding U.S. Supreme Court precedent laid
down well before handheld technology was even contemplated.
***
The iPhone may turn out to be the most popular invention of the
decade. Before its release in July 2007, crowds lined up for days to be among
the first to get the device.1 In the first three days on the market, Apple
sold more than a quarter of a million iPhones2 and the company expects to
3
sell more than ten million devices worldwide by the end of 2008. And
unlike many technological releases, customer satisfaction seemed to meet or
exceed expectations.4 Thus, sales can be expected to remain strong even as
competing companies follow suit with similar products.5
For those who have not had the opportunity to tinker with one, the
iPhone is a handheld wireless device that functions as a cell phone, BlackBerry,
camera, music player, and video player, while simultaneously providing
internet access. In short, for those on the go, the iPhone packages multiple
applications into a single device small enough to fit into a back pocket. It
does not take a crystal ball to predict that such devices will be ubiquitous in
the United States within a few years. Just as almost everyone for the last few
years has had a conventional cell phone at their disposal, it seems likely
that tens of millions of Americans will be driving around with either iPhones
or a competing product in their pockets or purses within the next few years.6
While the iPhone is a wonderful technological innovation and its
proliferation will no doubt improve everyday life, it comes with unexplored
1.
See Long Wait Over for iPhone Fans: Some Waited in Line Three Days for Debut, CHI. T RIB .,
June 30, 2007, at 1.
2.
See Eric Benderoff, Apple Credits iPhone Buyers: Early Adopters of the Device Who Are Upset
Over Quick Price Cut Get $100 Compensation, C HI. T RIB., Sept. 7, 2007, at 6 (“Apple sold about
270,000 iPhones [in] the first three days.”).
3.
See Katie Hafner, iPhone Futures Turn Out to Be a Risky Investment, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2007, at C3 (“Apple has said it expects to sell as many as 10 million phones by the end of 2008.”).
Analysts believe that the company can sell as many as forty-five million devices worldwide by the
end of 2009, due to a recent international rollout reaching 575 million potential customers. See
Philip Elmer-Dewitt, iPhone Rollout: 42 Countries, 575 Million Potential Customers, FORTUNE, May 16, 2008.
4.
A Westlaw search of “iPhone w/10 love” in the allnews database on July 31, 2008
yielded 461 documents.
5.
Michelle Roberts, AT&T Profit Soars: iPhone Gives Cell Provider a Boost, A UGUSTA
CHRON., July 25, 2007, at B11; Bob Tedeschi, Navigating the New World of Cellphones, as the Options
Pile Up, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, at C6; cf. Troy Wolverton, iPhone Outselling Rivals: Even So, It
May Be Falling Short of High Expectations, SAN JOSE M ERCURY NEWS, Sept. 5, 2007, at C2.
6.
Although there are competing handheld wireless products, for ease of exposition I will
simply refer to iPhones throughout this Article.
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legal repercussions. Specifically, what type of Fourth Amendment protection
should such devices receive? Can they be searched without a warrant or
without probable cause at a conventional traffic stop? And if so, how far
can law enforcement explore the contents of the devices without violating
the U.S. Constitution? In conducting a warrantless search of the handheld
device, are officers limited to scanning the displayed screen of an iPhone,
or are they permitted to manipulate the touch screen to open picture
files or an internet browser? And once those functions are open, how deep
can officers continue to look? Must the police stop when they see nothing
illegal in a list of displayed emails, or can they open different email folders
and begin to read messages? If the history page of an internet browser lists a
website that might suggest child pornography—for instance, “www.questionablepornography-here.com”—can the officer click on the hyperlink to bring
up the website? If the website page comes up and it appears that the arrestee
had used a saved password to enter the site previously, can the officer
click on the “submit” button to move beyond the front page and into the
salacious content?
Obviously, the framers of the Fourth Amendment could not have
conceived of a handheld technological device like the iPhone,7 and courts
have not yet been called upon to answer most of the difficult questions posed
by such devices.8 Yet, current Fourth Amendment doctrine strongly suggests
that the Supreme Court would authorize invasive searches of the iPhones
found in pockets or purses of arrested individuals.
For nearly four decades,9 the search incident to arrest doctrine has
functioned as a bright-line rule—allowing police to search the entire person
of an arrestee without getting into sticky questions of whether there was

7.
A large body of Fourth Amendment scholarship focuses on unforeseen technological
changes making it easier for law enforcement to investigate criminal activity. For an excellent
example deviating from the view that all advances merit greater court involvement, see Orin S. Kerr,
The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102
MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004). The iPhone scenario inverts the problem, however, by placing the
advanced technology in the hands (or pockets) of the one being searched, rather than the officer
doing the searching.
8.
A handful of courts have been asked to decide whether a search of a traditional cell
phone’s call history or text messages is permissible incident to arrest. With very narrow exceptions,
those courts have upheld the searches as valid. See infra notes 71–84 and accompanying text.
9.
Scholars convincingly maintain that the search incident to arrest doctrine is more than
nine decades old. See James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the Search Incident to
Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417 (dating the
search incident to arrest exception back to Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)). The modern incarnation of the doctrine can be traced
to U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s and 1970s.
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probable cause to open a particular container.10 While society and technology
have changed drastically over the last few decades, the search incident
to arrest rule has remained static.11 Thus, if we think of an iPhone as a
container12—like a cigarette package or a closed box—police can open and
search the contents inside with no questions asked and no probable cause
required, so long as they are doing so pursuant to a valid arrest. And as
scholars have long recognized, states have expansive criminal codes that give
13
police authority to arrest for a huge number of infractions. Thus, police
officers with nothing more than a hunch of illegal activity may arrest an
individual for a simple traffic violation14 and proceed to search thousands of
pages of private data located on the iPhone found in the arrestee’s pocket.15
10.
See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“The authority to search the
person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover
evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular
arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification.”); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
11.
As explained below, the Supreme Court has drastically expanded the reach of the search
incident to arrest exception. See infra notes 28–52 and accompanying text. As Professor James J.
Tomkovicz has chronicled in his recent article, over the last few decades “the Court [has] modestly,
but consistently, increased the scope of law enforcement authority to conduct automatic searches
following lawful arrests.” Tomkovicz, supra note 9, at 1441. By “static,” I mean only that the Court
has not accounted for new technology. On the need for new rules of criminal procedure to deal with
an increasingly digital world, see Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 279, 281–89 (2005) (arguing that existing criminal procedure law is tailored
toward tangible evidence in a way not suited to dealing with digital information).
12.
See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531,
538 (2005). Kerr explains that “computer searches and home searches are similar in many ways. In
both cases, the police attempt to find and retrieve useful information hidden inside a closed
container”; yet he also describes significant differences between computer data collection and
conventional searches.
13.
See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
431 (1958) (“What sense does it make to insist upon procedural safeguards in criminal prosecutions if
anything whatever can be made a crime in the first place?”); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 507 (2001) (“American criminal law, federal and
state, is very broad; it covers far more conduct than any jurisdiction could possibly punish. The
federal code alone has thousands of criminal prohibitions covering an enormous range of behavior,
from the heinous to the trivial. State codes are a little narrower, but not much.”). For instance,
whereas the Massachusetts Code contained 214 crimes in 1860, today the total number of offenses
exceeds 500. See id. at 514.
14.
See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (finding no constitutional
violation in arresting a driver for failure to wear a seatbelt and searching incident to that arrest).
This problem is what Professor Donald Dripps has referred to as the “Iron Triangle,” in which police
can pull over an automobile for pretextual reasons (so long as they can point to an almost unlimited
number of traffic violations), arrest individuals for almost any low-level misdemeanor infraction, and
then proceed to search the individual for contraband totally unrelated to the stop and arrest. See
Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: Determinacy Versus
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Part I of this Article provides an overview of the history and scope of
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Part II
reviews the handful of cases dealing with searches of conventional cell
phones and pagers incident to a lawful arrest. Part III then explains the
complicated problems that develop when this doctrine is applied to iPhones.
Finally, Part IV offers a number of approaches that courts and legislatures
could adopt to narrow the scope of warrantless searches of iPhones and
similar handheld wireless devices.

I.

THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST DOCTRINE AS A SEARCH
FOR BRIGHT-LINE RULES

The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but
16
upon probable cause.” Yet, as any criminal procedure student knows, the
Supreme Court has long recognized a slew of exceptions allowing the police
to search without first procuring a warrant.17 For purposes of this Article, there is
one exception of particular significance, perhaps the most common rationale for
police to search without a warrant18—the search incident to arrest doctrine.
The history of the search incident to arrest exception dates back to the
creation of the exclusionary rule in 1914, when the Supreme Court obliquely
suggested in dictum that the government has the right “to search the person
of the accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or
Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 393 (2004) (“The Iron Triangle means
in practice that the police have general search power over anyone traveling by automobile.”).
15.
Police will also likely conduct warrantless searches of iPhones at traffic stops under the
consent and automobile exceptions, though far less often than under the search incident to arrest
doctrine. Under the first, police will be permitted to search the contents of an iPhone if a reasonable
person would have thought his consent extended that far. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 922 F.
Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that consent to search a car in which suspect was traveling
extended to a search of a pager found inside the car). Under the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement, police will be permitted to search the contents of the iPhone at a traffic stop
if they have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of the crime they are investigating. For
instance, if police have probable cause to believe the owner of the iPhone is utilizing the phone’s text
message function to facilitate drug dealing, police could look through the text messages of an iPhone
found in a vehicle. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (allowing police to open
containers in an automobile without a warrant).
16.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17.
Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement are so pervasive and
disorganized that Professor Akhil Amar has referred to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as “a
sinking ocean liner—rudderless and badly off course.” Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759 (1994).
18.
See W AYNE R. L A F AVE , 3 S EARCH AND S EIZURE : A T REATISE ON THE F OURTH
AMENDMENT § 5.2(c) & n.55 (2007) (describing the search incident to arrest as probably the most
common type of police search).
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evidences of crime.”19 Although the Court alluded to such searches in that
case and a handful of other early decisions,20 the doctrine’s modern conception
21
was the 1969 decision in Chimel v. California.
In Chimel, police arrested a suspect in his home for burglary and proceeded to
search the entire three-bedroom house, as well as the attic and garage, for proceeds
of that burglary.22 While the Court found this warrantless search to be
unconstitutionally broad, it nevertheless recognized that police can search suspects
23
incident to arrest in narrower circumstances. The Court explained that a search
incident to arrest must be limited to a search for weapons that an arrestee could
use against the officer and to prevent an arrestee from concealing or destroying
evidence.24 The Court concluded that a search for weapons and evidence must be
limited to the arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control from
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destroy evidence.25 The Court
specifically rejected the contention that police could search areas beyond that
from which an arrestee could grab a weapon or evidence.26
A few years after Chimel, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether police could open closed containers located on an arrestee’s person.
27
In United States v. Robinson, police arrested a suspect for operating a motor
28
vehicle with a revoked license. While conducting a search incident to
arrest, the officer felt an object in Robinson’s coat pocket but could not tell
what it was.29 The officer reached into the pocket and pulled out a “crumpled
up cigarette package.”30 Still not sure what was in the package, the officer
31
opened it and discovered capsules of heroin. In rejecting Robinson’s
challenge to the search, the Court made clear that officers conducting
a search incident to arrest can open and search through all items on an arrestee’s
person, even if they are in a closed container, and even if the officers have no
suspicion that the contents of the container are illegal.32 The Court explained
19.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
20.
For a recent and excellent discussion of the history of the search incident to arrest
doctrine, see Tomkovicz, supra note 9, at 1421–45.
21.
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
22.
Id. at 754.
23.
Id. at 763, 768.
24.
Id. at 763.
25.
Id.
26.
Id. at 768.
27.
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
28.
Id. at 220.
29.
Id. at 223.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at 235–36.
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that the search incident to arrest doctrine does not require case-by-case
adjudication and that there need not be analysis of each step of the search to
determine whether it was necessary to prevent the arrestee from acquiring
weapons or destroying evidence.33 Rather, Robinson made clear that searches of
the arrestee’s person and the containers thereon can be conducted automatically
incident to an arrest. The Court’s decision thus created a bright-line rule.
The Court’s affinity for bright-line rules became even clearer eight years
34
later in New York v. Belton. In Belton, the officer stopped a car for speeding and,
upon smelling marijuana, arrested the occupants.35 With the occupants away
from the vehicle, the officer then searched the passenger compartment of the car
and found a jacket in the backseat. The officer unzipped the pockets of the
jacket and found cocaine.36 Praising its decision in Robinson, the Court
reaffirmed that police officers must be afforded “a straightforward rule, easily
applied, and predictably enforced.”37 Lamenting that there was not yet such
straightforward rule for the search of the interior of a car at a traffic stop, the Court
adopted another bright-line rule permitting the search of the entire passenger
compartment of an automobile when an occupant of the car is lawfully arrested.38
Just as in Robinson, the Court made clear that the bright-line rule would
apply even if there were no chance that an arrestee could break free of his
restraints to grab a weapon or destroy evidence in the passenger compartment
of the car. The Court further explained that the search of the passenger
compartment included any containers found therein, whether open or closed,
and irrespective of whether they could contain a weapon or evidence.39 The
Belton decision marked a considerable expansion of the search incident to
arrest doctrine.40

33.
Id. at 235.
34.
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
35.
Id. at 455–56.
36.
Id. at 456.
37.
Id. at 459.
38.
Id. at 460.
39.
Id. at 461. The Court did not make clear in Belton, nor has it in any subsequent cases,
whether locked containers in an automobile can be opened incident to arrest. For a survey of the
lower court authority, see L AF AVE , supra note 18, § 7.1(c) n.99. Likewise, the Court has never
squarely addressed the question of whether the trunk portion of an SUV, station wagon, or
hatchback qualifies as being part of the passenger compartment of the vehicle. See, e.g., Sellman v.
State, 828 A.2d 803, 818 (Md. 2003) (describing the issue of whether a hatchback is in the passenger
compartment as a “fact-bound question”). For a long list of cases reaching different conclusions on
this issue, see LAFAVE, supra note 18, § 7.1(c) n.96.
40.
See Tomkovicz, supra note 9, at 1437 (explaining that the Belton Court “was instigating
a new era of expansion for search incident authority”).
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In the Court’s last significant search incident to arrest decision, the 2004
decision in Thornton v. United States,41 an automobile was again the focus of
42
attention. Unlike the occupant in Belton, the Thornton case involved a driver
who had already exited and walked away from his vehicle before being
approached by police.43 After Thornton was arrested for drug possession, the
officer then proceeded to his vehicle and searched the passenger compartment
incident to arrest. The officer found a handgun under the seat, which led to
a charge of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking
crime.44 The Court once again stressed the need for a “clear rule, readily
understood by police officers and not depending on differing estimates of what
items were or were not within reach of an arrestee at any particular moment.”45
In rejecting Thornton’s suppression argument, the Court extended the Belton
rule to permit a full-scale search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle
incident to the arrest of a “recent occupant” of a vehicle.46
The Court’s decisions over the last forty years suggest that the
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement should
be interpreted expansively. Indeed, in Belton, the Court specifically
stated that “container” should be interpreted broadly to include “any
object capable of holding another object. It thus includes closed or
open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes,
bags, clothing, and the like.”47 Consistent with this guidance, lower
courts have taken a broad approach and upheld searches of numerous
small containers incident to arrest, such as wallets,48 envelopes, 49 and aspirin
41.
541 U.S. 615 (2004).
42.
Id. at 617–19.
43.
Id. at 618.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. at 623.
46.
See id. at 623–24. Ironically, the Court’s celebration of a bright-line approach makes little sense
when the Court has provided no guidance as to who qualifies as a “recent occupant” of a vehicle. See George
Dery & Michael J. Hernandez, Turning a Government Search Into a Permanent Power: Thornton v. United
States and the “Progressive Distortion” of Search Incident to Arrest, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 677, 698
(2005) (“The stage is thus now set for needless litigation as to the boundaries of Thornton’s not-so-bright-line
rule. Attorneys in the courts and officers on the beat will struggle in their attempts to determine who
qualifies as a ‘recent occupant’ of a vehicle. The spawning of case after case attempting to clarify the outer
boundaries of Thornton’s time and space rule creates the very confusion Belton originally aimed to avoid.”).
47.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981).
48.
See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776, 778 (7th Cir. 1993) (permitting the searching of a
wallet and photocopying of an address book incident to arrest); United States v. Hatfield, 815 F.2d 1068, 1071–72
(6th Cir. 1987) (upholding the search of a wallet incident to arrest as well as the admission of lock picks found in
the wallet); State v. Winston, 295 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1982) (upholding the search of a wallet).
49.
See, e.g., United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 1985) (upholding the search
of an envelope found in a locked glove compartment).
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bottles.50 Although some state courts have interpreted their own constitutions
and criminal codes to be more restrictive than the Constitution,51 most lower
courts have not hesitated to apply the search incident to arrest doctrine to
new situations unforeseen by the Supreme Court.52

II.

BRIGHT-LINE RULES IN AN ERA OF PAGERS AND CELL PHONES
53

54

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Robinson and Belton made clear
that, incident to a lawful arrest, officers can open containers located on a
person or in their immediate grabbing space without having any independent
probable cause to search those containers.55 For many years, the only evidence
found as a result of such searches was tangible physical evidence, such as
drugs or illegal weapons. As technology has advanced however, a handful of
lower courts have been forced to rule on the admissibility of nontangible
digital evidence located in electronic devices, specifically pagers, cell phones,
and computers. These courts have been forced to confront whether the
search incident to arrest doctrine—designed with a world of tangible evidence
in mind—should apply to data digitally contained in electronic devices.
Most courts have upheld such searches.
The earliest of these electronic data cases (and consequently the most
primitive of the technology at issue) was a 1993 decision from the Northern
District of California dealing with a pager found on an arrestee. 56 The
defendant, Chan, was arrested as part of a drug sting operation and police
found a pager on Chan’s person.57 The police then activated the pager’s
58
memory function and retrieved telephone numbers stored inside it. Two
numbers found in the pager linked Chan to the drug sting the police were

50.
See Daniels v. State, 416 So.2d 760 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).
51.
See, e.g., State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (relying on a state
constitution to conclude that the police may not search a locked glove compartment incident to
arrest without procuring a warrant).
52.
See, e.g., supra notes 48–50.
53.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
54.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
55.
See Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to
Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 381 (2001) (“Compared to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
more generally, with its well-earned reputation for complexity and variability, the search incident to
arrest exception to the Amendment’s warrant requirement would appear an oasis of consistency.”).
56.
United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
57.
Id. at 533.
58.
Id.
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conducting.59 Chan contended that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the pager and that activating it amounted to a search that required a warrant.60
The court sided with Chan in part by agreeing that a pager is analogous
to a closed container and that individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the contents of electronic containers.61 However, the court
ultimately concluded that because the search of the pager came on the heels
of a lawful arrest of Chan, a warrantless search was permitted under the
search incident to arrest doctrine.62 Citing Belton and Chimel,63 the court
concluded that all containers can be searched incident to a lawful arrest,
including electronic containers.64 Moreover, the court considered and
specifically rejected as irrelevant the fact that Chan could not retrieve a
weapon from the pager nor plausibly destroy any evidence from the pager.65
Accordingly, the evidence found when the officer turned on and searched the
pager was admissible.66
Over the next few years, a handful of other courts were called upon to
analyze the question raised in Chan and these courts likewise permitted the
search of the contents of a pager incident to arrest.67 These courts reiterated
that the search incident to arrest exception allows police to open all
containers on a person and further explained that pagers are analogous to a
wallet or address book, which courts have long permitted police to search
incident to a lawful arrest.68 One court further recognized that it was
especially important to search pagers quickly because an incoming page could
destroy existing numbers currently stored in the pager’s memory.69

59.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
Id. at 535.
62.
Id. at 535–36.
63.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
64.
Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 536.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 536.
67.
See United States v. Hunter, No. 96-4259, 1998 WL 887289, at *3 (4th Cir. Oct. 29,
1998) (per curiam) (upholding the retrieval of numbers from a pager); United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d
977, 983–84 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Stroud, No. 93-30445, 1994 WL 711908, at *2
(9th Cir. Dec. 21, 1994) (same); United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1223 (11th Cir.
1993) (holding that it is permissible to insert batteries and reactivate the beeper so that it may be
called after an arrest); United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (upholding the
retrieval of numbers from a pager); United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284, 290 (D.V.I. 1995) (same).
68.
See Lynch, 908 F. Supp. at 288.
69.
See Ortiz, 84 F.3d at 984; see also United States v. Zamora, No. 1:05CR250(WSD), 2006
WL 418390, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2006) (recognizing with respect to cell phones that they are
dynamic and that “[w]ith each call is the risk that a number stored would be deleted”).
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The era of pagers has all but ended, making way for the age of cell
phones. At first, cell phones were used primarily for phone calls, but in
recent years text messaging has become a very commonly used feature as
well.70 To date, fewer than a dozen courts have addressed searches of cell
phones incident to arrest. The Fifth Circuit’s recent 2007 decision in United
States v. Finley71 is representative. Police arrested Finley after a staged drug
72
sale. The police then searched Finley incident to arrest and found a cell
73
phone in his pocket. One of the investigating officers searched through
the phone’s records and found text messages that appeared to relate to drug
trafficking.74 One incoming text message said, “So u wanna get some frozen
agua,” a common term for methamphetamine.75 Another text message said,
“Call Mark I need a 50,” a likely reference to asking for fifty dollars’ worth of
narcotics.76 Finley was convicted of aiding and abetting drug possession with
77
intent to distribute.
On appeal, Finley contended that the search of his cell phone was
unlawful. The Fifth Circuit rejected Finley’s contention that the cell phone
could be seized but not searched.78 Relying on the conventional search
incident to arrest caselaw—namely United States v. Robinson and New York v.
Belton79—the court explained that “police officers are not constrained to search
only for weapons or instruments of escape on the arrestee’s person; they may
also, without any additional justification, look for evidence of the arrestee’s
crime on his person in order to preserve it for use at trial.”80 The court further
explained that police can open containers found on the arrestee’s person and
saw no reason why the doctrine should not be extended to text messages
contained in a cell phone.81
In short, the Fifth Circuit did not recognize any conceptual difference
between searching a person’s body or physical containers on that body for
70.
See David Hayes, The Cell Phone Is Called on to Do It All—A Wireless Wonder: With
Features Ad Infinitum, It’s Getting to Be Like Your Personal Computer, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 30, 2005,
at A1 (“After years of relatively slow growth, U.S. wireless subscribers now are sending billions of
text messages each month.”).
71.
477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
72.
Id. at 253–54.
73.
Id. at 254.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at 254 n.2.
76.
Id.
77.
Id. at 255.
78.
See id. at 260.
79.
See supra text accompanying notes 28–40.
80.
Finley, 477 F.3d at 259–60.
81.
See id. at 260.
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drugs and searching electronic equipment for digital information. A handful
of district courts have reached the same conclusion as the Fifth Circuit and
admitted evidence seized from cell phones.82
To be sure, two lower courts have suppressed evidence found on cell
phones pursuant to a search incident to arrest. Yet, those decisions rested
primarily on grounds that the search took place too long after the arrest to be
considered a contemporaneous search incident to arrest.83
Perhaps the reason for the lack of contrary authority is that searching a
conventional cell phone or pager incident to arrest is relatively easy to square
with precedent that permits police to search tangible containers found on an
82.
See United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb.
8, 2008) (upholding the search of a cell phone’s address book and call logs incident to arrest, though
noting that “we can leave for another day the propriety of a broader search equivalent to the search
of a personal computer”); United States v. Curry, No. 07-100-P-H, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5438, at
*30–31 (D. Me. Jan. 23, 2008) (upholding the search of a cell phone for call logs from a drug
informant); United States v. Lottie, No. 3:07-CR-51-AS, 2007 WL 4722439, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Oct.
12, 2007) (upholding the search of a cell phone primarily on exigency grounds but arguably under
the search incident to arrest exception as well); United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d
1271, 1275–76 (D. Kan. 2007) (upholding the search of a cell phone for numbers of outgoing and
incoming calls); United States v. Murphy, No. 1:06CR00062, 2006 WL 3761384, at *4 (W.D. Va.
Dec. 20, 2006) (upholding the search of a cell phone’s text messages); United States v. Diaz, No. CR
05-0167 WHA, 2006 WL 3193770, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2006) (upholding the recording of
names and numbers in an address book and recording messages); United States v. Zamora, No. 1:05
CR 250 WSD, 2006 WL 418390, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2006) (upholding the search of a cell
phone for numbers of outgoing and incoming calls); United States v. Cote, No. 03 CR271, 2005 WL
1323343, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2006) (upholding the search of a cell phone’s call log, phone
book, and wireless web inbox); United States v. Brookes, No. CRIM 2004-0154, 2005 WL 1940124,
at *3 (D.V.I. June 16, 2005) (upholding the search of numbers in a cell phone and pager); United
States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1303–04 (D. Kan. 2003) (upholding the search of stored
numbers to prevent destruction of evidence).
83.
See United States v. Park, No. CR-05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal.
May 23, 2007); United States v. Lasalle, No. 07-00032 SOM, 2007 WL 1390820, at *7–8 (D. Haw. May
9, 2007); cf. United States v. Carroll, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1299 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (expressing
skepticism at search incident to arrest of a BlackBerry when the suspect surrendered at the police
station, but ordering further briefing before deciding the issue). In Park, the court stated that “due to
the quantity and quality of information that can be stored on a cellular phone, a cellular phone
should not be characterized as an element of [an] individual’s clothing or person, but rather as a
possession within an arrestee’s immediate control that has fourth amendment protection at the
station house.” 2007 WL 1521573, at *9 (internal quotation marks omitted). This approach
conceivably makes sense if the court is saying that the search of the cell phone was impermissible
because it occurred too long after the arrest. But if the court is contending that the search was
instead invalid because it was a search of the possessions within the arrestee’s immediate control
rather than on his person, it is difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s decision in New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462–63 (1981), and other cases that repeatedly reaffirm that a search incident
to arrest extends to the person’s area of immediate control. Perhaps for this reason, the Park decision
stands contrary to eleven other decisions upholding the searches of cell phones incident to arrest and
another seven decisions permitting the search of pagers incident to arrest. See sources cited supra
notes 67, 82.
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arrestee.84 A cell phone’s memory of incoming and outgoing calls, as well as
its text messages, can easily be analogized to an address book or a letter in an
envelope.85 Much as the traditional search incident to arrest cases permit
police to open a wallet, take out a letter, and read it before the arrestee has an
opportunity to destroy the evidence, it also makes sense to allow the police
to review electronic call histories and text messages in a cell phone.86 An
arrestee familiar with the functions of his cell phone could just as easily delete
text messages or call logs as he could tear up a letter or an incriminating list
of addresses on a piece of paper.

III.

THE STAKES AND LIKELY RESULTS WHEN THE iPHONE MEETS
THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST DOCTRINE

To date, no court has been called upon to address the constitutionality
of searching an iPhone. In light of the handful of cell phone and pager cases
discussed by the lower federal and state courts,87 it might seem that there is no
difference in searching an iPhone. Just as text messages stored on a cell
phone are evidence within a digital container, it would seem that call histories,
emails, and pictures on an iPhone would simply be characterized as evidence
stored in a (larger) digital container. As a conceptual matter, there is no real
difference between a crumpled up cigarette package, an early-generation cell
phone, and an iPhone with a much larger memory. Yet, this is cause for
concern because no matter what theoretical similarities exist between
84.
More puzzling is why there are so few reported cases of police searching cell phones or
pagers incident to arrest. One possibility is that such searches are regularly conducted, but no
evidence is found. This result would tend to make sense because unless police are actively
investigating a case, a series of pager numbers or an address book of contacts may not be incriminating without further information. While text messages might be more immediately incriminating, it is
only in the last few years that the text message craze has begun in earnest. See David Ovalle, Texting
Gets Dicey With Booze, MIAMI HERALD, June 13, 2005, at 1A. A related possibility is that police are
not yet regularly engaged in searching cell phones and electronic devices, possibly because they are so
accustomed to searching for tangible evidence such as drugs. A third explanation is that police are
conducting such searches but that defendants plead guilty rather than continuing to challenge the search
and risk conviction. In any event, the paucity of cases is not likely to last for long as iPhones will
likely become an attractive target for police searching for evidence of illegal activity.
85.
See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776 (7th Cir, 1993) (upholding the search
of a wallet and photocopying of an address book incident to lawful arrest); United States v.
Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 958 (6th Cir. 1990) (“The digital display pager, by its very nature, is
nothing more than a contemporary receptacle for telephone numbers.”).
86.
See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284 (D.V.I. 1995) (refusing to suppress
data found from search of pager incident to arrest because the search of a pager for phone numbers is
just like the search of a wallet or address book found on a person); see also Cote, 2005 WL 1323343,
at *6 (refusing to suppress data found on a cell phone for the same reason).
87.
See supra notes 56–83 and accompanying text.
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an iPhone and a conventional cell phone (or a cigarette package for that
matter), the former stores tremendously more information and in a very
different way. The differences can be demonstrated by thinking about how
many steps or searches police might be able to take with respect to the
new and old technology.
The cell phone and pager cases decided by courts in the last few years
are what we might call first level cases because they do not require in-depth
searching to obtain evidence. Police need to push only a limited number of
buttons in order to reach pager numbers and only a few additional buttons to
retrieve text messages. If we think of each step that police must take to retrieve
information as a separate search, then reviewing pager numbers might
amount to only two levels of searches: first, pushing the memory button
for the list of recent pages; and second, scrolling through the numbers to find
the incriminating calls. Reviewing text messages on a cell phone can be
conceptualized as three separate searches: (1) opening the text message
function; (2) opening the list of received text messages; and (3) opening and
reading a particular text message. This is similar to the searches in Robinson88
where the police officer (1) felt the cigarette package; (2) pulled out the
package; and (3) opened the package.
Put simply, the data on early-generation cell phones is limited in its
amount and usefulness, and police officers will either find the evidence or
run into a dead end rather quickly. Accordingly, the degree of privacy
invasion can be measured by the number of steps an officer must take to
retrieve the incriminating information. In the cases decided to date dealing
with text messages and pagers, this number has been small because those
devices have few, relatively simple functions capable of storing electronic
data. The same can be said for tangible evidence such as cigarette packages,
purses, wallets, or suitcases.
The iPhone drastically changes this situation for two reasons. First, the
iPhone stores tremendously more information—thereby providing law
enforcement with access to information that the typical arrestee would
otherwise be incapable of carrying in his pocket. In addition to the text
messages, contact information, and call histories found on conventional
phones, iPhones also contain an iPhoto application. This application holds
far more pictures than could be stored on a conventional cell phone and
displays them in much clearer detail. Similarly, the iPhone’s easily accessible
email application makes it simple to access thousands of new, saved, and sent
email messages. The iPhone enables users to store thousands of audio and
88.

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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video files. Music, books, and videos ranging from classical music to
potentially obscene pornographic videos can be accessed with the touch of
a few buttons.
Second, and perhaps with greater ramifications than the data stored on
the actual device, the iPhone provides a mechanism for accessing information
via the internet. The iPhone’s internet browser is just like the one found
on a standard computer; it can dial out and retrieve information stored
remotely with an internet service provider. An example is instructive.
Imagine that an officer arrests an individual following a lawful traffic
stop and finds an iPhone in the driver’s pocket. The officer then takes the
following steps: (1) activates the touch screen to view the phone’s contents;
(2) clicks on the internet browser icon; (3) clicks on the toolbar to find the
bookmarks link; (4) finds a suspicious-looking bookmark labeled “porn
pictures”; (5) clicks on that particular bookmark to bring up the webpage;
(6) sees that the webpage contains a series of icons including a “members”
button and clicks on that image; (7) brings up the “members” page which has
a saved account number and password already entered; (8) clicks on the
“submit” button which utilizes the saved account information and password
to bring up the content of the website; (9) sees that, in addition to pictures,
the website also has a message function and the account owner has two
new messages; and (10) clicks on the message icon and brings up the two new
messages, both of which detail an incriminating conversation about exchanging
pictures of underage children.
Or imagine how an officer could utilize the internet to circumvent an
arrestee’s privacy protections, such as if an arrestee had password-protected
his iPhoto application to hide his photographs. After (1) turning on the
iPhone; and (2) attempting to open the iPhoto application, the officer
discovers that the application is password-protected and cannot be opened.89
89.
The Supreme Court has not clearly determined whether officers can open a locked
container, such as a glove compartment, during a search incident to arrest. Many courts have
permitted such searches. See, e.g., United States v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 1269–70 (7th Cir. 1995);
State v. Fry, 388 N.W.2d 565, 577 (Wis. 1986). There is contrary authority however. See State v.
Stroud, 720 P.2d 436 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (relying on a state constitution to conclude that police
may not search a locked glove compartment incident to arrest without procuring a warrant).
In a recent decision, a federal magistrate concluded that it would violate a defendant’s Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination to be compelled to provide the government with
the password that encrypted a laptop found during a search at the Canadian border. See In re
Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 4246473, at *6 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007). For criticism of the
decision, see Sherry F. Colb, Does the Fifth Amendment Protect the Refusal to Reveal Computer
Passwords? In a Dubious Ruling, A Vermont Magistrate Judge Says Yes, FINDLAW’S WRIT, Feb. 4, 2008,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20080204.html. On the rise of computer searches at the border,
see Adam Liptak, If Your Hard Drive Could Testify . . . , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008, at A12 (discussing
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The officer might then (3) activate the internet browser; (4) click on the
browsing history to see what webpages the owner had visited; (5) click on
the history link that referenced the arrestee’s web-based email account—for
instance, Yahoo! or Gmail; (6) read through the folders in the email account
until finding one labeled “personal information”; (7) read through the
messages in that folder until finding an email with the subject “passwords”;
(8) open that email and retrieve the password for the iPhoto application; (9)
close the internet browser and again click on the iPhoto application; (10) enter
the password found in the email, thus opening the iPhoto application; (11)
search through the folders in the iPhoto application, finding the most
suspiciously labeled folder—for instance, “kid pics”; and (12) open that folder
and search through all of the pictures inside that folder.
Countless other complicated scenarios could likewise be envisioned. As
the scenarios become more convoluted, it becomes harder to analogize
them to a closed container or a wallet containing an address list. And
indeed, the iPhone provides access to information that would almost never
before be found in arrestees’ pockets or immediate grabbing space, but which
could potentially subject them to criminal prosecution. For instance:
(1) bank statements accessed via the saved password on your banking
website90 or (2) MySpace or Facebook webpages that have personal data,
pictures, contacts, and exchanges of messages, might be rich sources of
incriminating information.91
emerging cases in which the government compares searching a hard drive to rummaging through a
suitcase); Ellen Nakashima, Clarity Sought on Electronic Searches: U.S. Agents Seize Travelers’
Devices, W ASH. P OST , Feb. 7, 2008, at A1 (describing suspicionless searches of electronic
data of international air travel passengers at the border, including requiring passengers to enter
passwords into their laptops, copying the histories of websites visited on those laptops, reviewing
documents saved in Microsoft Word, compiling lists of phone numbers in cell phones, and
demanding to see emails). For a scholarly assessment of the border searches, see Christine A.
Coletta, Note, Laptop Searches at the United States Borders and the Border Search Exception to the Fourth
Amendment, 48 B.C. L. REV. 971 (2007).
90.
“Banking data is a fertile source of evidence for prosecution.” See, e.g., Cassondra Kirby,
Two Lexington Women Indicted on Money Laundering Charges: Accused of Bilking Millions for Luxuries,
LEXINGTON-HERALD L EADER , Dec. 3, 2005, at B4 (recounting how a defendant denied money
laundering charges but prosecutors said that “her bank records show otherwise”).
91.
Prosecutors increasingly are finding MySpace and Facebook profiles to be a source of
evidence. See Erica Perez, Getting Booked by Facebook: Police Are Finding, With Help of Networking
Sites, That Students Are Incriminating Themselves Online, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 2007, at
A1 (“Facebook.com and MySpace.com are the newest crime-busting tools in a police officer’s
repertoire, particularly for campus police, who are using the sites to investigate student crimes and
violations and gather information about where students live and whom they know. In some cases,
the information they find is making its way into court.”); Michael A. Scarcella, 14 Are Targeted in
Gang Sweep: Accused of Ties to Manatee’s SUR 13, and Facing Racketeering Charges, SARASOTA
HERALD TRIB., July 7, 2007, at B1 (“A new trend in law enforcement has police surfing MySpace
pages on the Internet for evidence in criminal cases.”); Joseph Person, Uploading Zone a Risky Place to
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In searching for incriminating information, officers will no doubt come
into contact with extremely sensitive personal information that is not
remotely illegal but which is nevertheless highly embarrassing. For instance,
by searching an arrestee’s internet browsing history, police might stumble
across chat rooms demonstrating that the arrestee has unusual sexual proclivities.
Or police might discover that the arrestee is homosexual and is trying to keep
that information secret from her family or employer. If the arrestee is a
politician, the ramifications would be particularly devastating if police were
to discover from his emails that he has been having an affair or that he made
derogatory comments about other political figures. Additionally, an arrestee’s
internet browsing history or his bookmarked webpages might lead to a health
insurance website that includes bills for a serious or embarrassing medical
condition. The list of scenarios is endless. And while such embarrassing,
but not incriminating, information probably would not be admissible in
a prosecution, its discovery would cause emotional distress. Moreover, while
noncriminal information should never be released beyond the initial traffic
stop if it has no place in a prosecution, it sometimes manages to find its way
into the public domain.92
In sum, the search incident to arrest doctrine permits police to search
the contents of any container found on the arrestee, including electronic
receptacles of digital information. Courts already have held that the doctrine
applies to the electronic contents of pagers and cell phones and permits the
copying of phone numbers and the reading of text messages. If courts
take the next step—and they almost certainly will—by applying the search
incident to arrest doctrine to the iPhone, officers will be in a position to
review incoming and outgoing call histories, scan contact lists, read
thousands of emails, view nearly limitless numbers of color photographs and
movies, listen to voicemail at the touch of the button, and view the internet
websites that an arrestee has visited.

Park, STATE, May 28, 2006, at C1 (describing college athletes who videotaped their underage
drinking and posted it online on Facebook).
92.
See, e.g., Brian Rogers & Matt Stiles, County DA Wants Court to Seal Revealing Emails:
Correspondence Brings to Light His Close Relationship With Secretary, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 26,
2007, at A1 (describing romantic emails from the Harris County District Attorney to his secretary
that were intended to be produced under seal as part of a civil rights lawsuit but that were
nevertheless released into the public domain).
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DISENTANGLING THE iPHONE FROM A BRIGHT-LINE RULE:
POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO CABINING THE SEARCH INCIDENT
TO ARREST DOCTRINE

The difference between the data found on a cell phone and an iPhone
is dramatic but, at present, the Fourth Amendment and its search incident to
arrest doctrine make no distinction. In this Part, I consider what approaches,
if any, courts and legislatures might adopt to address this problem.
A.

Change Nothing: The Search Incident to Arrest Rule Works Well,
So Changing It to Account for New Technology Is Not a Good Idea

While it is undoubtedly troubling to permit suspicionless searches of the
many applications of an iPhone, one could plausibly argue that attempting to
craft a rule disallowing such searches would be worse. At present, the search
incident to arrest doctrine is a bright-line rule that is easy for police officers to
understand and apply. And courts faced with a search incident to arrest
usually have an easy time determining whether the officers’ actions were
permissible. Compare this to the rest of Fourth Amendment law, which is
riddled with exceptions, caveats, and uncertainty.93 Indeed, the typical
Fourth Amendment section of a criminal procedure textbook is at least twice
as long as the Fifth Amendment section.94 Carving out an exception to
the search incident to arrest doctrine to deal with the iPhone might afford
more privacy protection to a device that is capable of holding reams of
personal information that individuals reasonably expect to be protected
against government intrusion, but at what cost? There is a colorable argument

93.
See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473
(1985) (“In fact, the exceptions [to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement] are neither few
nor well-delineated. There are over twenty exceptions to the probable cause or the warrant
requirement or both.”); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) (contending that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement has
“become so riddled with exceptions that it [is] basically unrecognizable”).
94.
See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PERSPECTIVES (2d ed. 2003); MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS (3d ed. 2007). Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor made this very point in opposing a public safety exception to the Miranda
doctrine. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 663–64 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part) (“The end result will be a finespun new doctrine on public safety
exigencies incident to custodial interrogation, complete with the hair-splitting distinctions that
currently plague our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”).
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that any benefit to be had from a new rule would be outweighed by muddling one
of the few areas of Fourth Amendment law that is currently intelligible.95
Moreover, as Professor Orin Kerr has explained, not every change in
technology necessitates changing the rules of constitutional criminal procedure
to be more protective of individuals.96 The same courts that have made a
mess of current Fourth Amendment law may lack the institutional competence
to draft rules for emerging technology. As Professor Kerr has explained,
“[j]udges cannot readily understand how the technologies may develop,
cannot easily appreciate context, and often cannot even recognize whether
the facts of the case before them raise privacy implications that happen to be
typical or atypical.”97
While I do not desire that Fourth Amendment law be made any more
complicated, ultimately, I am not convinced that courts should restrain
themselves by applying an ill-fitting bright-line rule to the iPhone.98 I see
two primary reasons.
First, the major informal constraints typically facing police in executing
searches are not present with respect to the iPhone. As Professor Bill Stuntz
has explained, police investigations are ordinarily constrained by limited
resources and limited time.99 New technology is typically expensive in law
and economic terms. Thus, while the Supreme Court has held that there is
no Fourth Amendment search when police observe backyards from helicopters or planes,100 that has not enabled police to do so with impunity. Police
departments typically cannot afford to buy or rent helicopters, nor do they
95.
By “intelligible” I do not mean to suggest that the search incident to arrest doctrine is
sound or logical. To the contrary, I am in agreement with Professor James J. Tomkovicz’s recent
criticism that the bright-line rule allows police to conduct an automatic search incident to arrest
when there is no conceivable way that the arrestee could grab a weapon or destroy evidence. See
Tomkovicz, supra note 9, at 1452–53.
96.
See Kerr, supra note 7, at 805.
97.
Id. at 858–59.
98.
Professor Orin Kerr might very well agree because he has explained that
[his] argument applies only when technologies are in flux. [His] concern is the institutional
competence of courts and legislatures when facts are changing quickly. As a result, [his]
interest is not whether a given case involves a “technology” in an absolute sense, but rather
whether the basic assumptions upon which rules are generated are likely to remain constant
or to shift in unpredictable ways.
See id. at 859.
99.
See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 C OLUM . L. R EV . 1795, 1821 (1998)
(explaining how it is lower cost for police to search for drugs in poor neighborhoods where
transactions are conducted on the street while searching for drugs in upscale neighborhoods costs
more because transactions are behind closed doors and more secretive).
100.
See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that warrantless
aerial surveillance does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207 (1986) (same).
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have the time to file flight plans, spend hours in the air, and simply look
around without being guided by some particularized suspicion.101
With respect to the iPhone, however, the new technology inverts the
typical state of affairs because it is the individual, not the police officer, who
has the new technology. Moreover, unlike flyovers or costly thermal imaging
devices,102 the technology is everywhere. Apple expects to sell more than ten
103
million iPhones by the end of 2008. In the next decade, millions of drivers
will have an iPhone or a substantially similar device in their pockets during
many of the nearly thirty million traffic stops that occur each year.104 And
unlike helicopters or thermal imagers, the cost to police in searching is almost
nil. A study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that police searched the
car or the driver in 6.6 percent of the twenty-seven million traffic stops that
occurred in a particular year.105 Upwards of 470,000 searches were conducted
106
incident to arrest at a traffic stop. If police are already conducting such
searches incident to arrest, they can easily take a few extra moments to seize
the iPhone, turn it on, and start rummaging through its files and applications.107
101.
See Craig Wong, Fleet Expansion Chops Earnings, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 15, 2006, at F5
(noting that the average cost of a new helicopter is roughly CAD $500,000); Laura Fasbach, Should
N.J. Governors Go by Chopper? Corzine Smash-Up Prompts a New Look at Air Travel, RECORD, Apr.
23, 2007, at A1 (explaining that a state police helicopter costs about $2800 an hour to pay for fuel
and the pilot). As one British police officer explained, “we never go on a [helicopter] job without
the economics of it being evaluated.” Gerry Hold, Police Helicopter Costs Pounds: 19-a-Minute to Run,
S. WALES ECHO, June 26, 2006, at 6.
102.
In Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the use of a
thermal imaging device to measure heat coming from a house amounted to a Fourth Amendment
search requiring probable cause and a warrant. Nevertheless, the Court’s 2001 decision turned in
large part on the fact that the thermal imaging technology was not in general public use, a factual
conclusion that likely would not be true today. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment
Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 539 (2007) (explaining that the Supreme Court decides only a
handful of cases under its reasonable expectation of privacy test and that lower court decisions
involving factual variations tend to be authoritative).
103.
See Hafner, supra note 3.
104.
See BUREAU OF J USTICE S TATISTICS , U.S. DEP’T OF J USTICE, C HARACTERISTICS OF
DRIVERS STOPPED BY POLICE, 1999, at 1, 4 (2002) (estimating that in 1999, “19.3 million drivers age
16 or older, or 10.3% of all licensed drivers were stopped by police” and that because some drivers
were stopped more than once, a total of 27 million traffic stops occurred).
105.
See id. at 10.
106.
See id. at 12.
107.
I will concede, however, that good police officers conducting a standard traffic arrest
might be reluctant to spend significant time searching an iPhone because they simply have no idea
what to look for or where incriminating information might be hidden. Drugs can be held in only a
few areas and are relatively easy to uncover during a search incident to arrest. In contrast, when
searching an iPhone officers would likely have no idea which emails or websites to browse to find
incriminating information. Of course, it is not just the “good” police officers, but also the overly
aggressive officers with which the Fourth Amendment must be concerned. I am grateful to Professor
Orin Kerr for making this point to me.
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The iPhone drastically changes the amount of private information that
can be accessed during a search incident to arrest. And unlike thermal imaging
devices or airplane flyovers, iPhone searches could potentially affect millions
of people. The stakes are higher and it is worth considering whether the
search incident to arrest doctrine might be amended to fit this problem.
B.

Change Everything: Limiting the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine
in All Police Interactions to a Search Related to the Crime of Arrest

The most drastic change to the search incident to arrest doctrine—short
of abolishing it altogether—would be to limit officers to searching for
evidence of the crime for which the suspect was arrested. Thus, if the driver
were arrested for drug possession, police could search anywhere drugs might
be found. But if the driver were arrested for failure to wear a seatbelt, a search
for drugs would be impermissible. Justice Antonin Scalia advocated this
revision to the search incident to arrest doctrine in his 2004 concurring
opinion in Thornton v. United States,108 in which the Supreme Court upheld
109
the search of the passenger compartment of a “recently” occupied car.
Joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Scalia argued that searching a
vehicle incident to arrest should only be permitted when “it is reasonable
to believe evidence related to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle.”110 Justice Scalia’s view departs from the traditional rationale for
the search incident to arrest doctrine. Instead of conducting the searches to
prevent the arrestee from harming the officer or destroying evidence, such
searches would be justified as “evidence-gathering” exercises that can be
conducted because of “a reasonable belief that evidence [will] be found.”111
Justice Scalia wrote for only himself and Justice Ginsburg in expressing
this view, so we might be inclined to dismiss this approach as simply unlikely
to be adopted. However, as Professor James Tomkovicz has recently explained,
it is not altogether implausible to assume that Justice Scalia’s position may
some day command a majority: Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have
not yet had a chance to address this approach, and Justice Stevens and Justice

108.
109.
110.
111.

541 U.S. 615 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 623–24, 632 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 632.
Id.
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Souter are on record as being very dissatisfied with the current state of
the search incident to arrest doctrine. 112
Besides its unlikely adoption, perhaps a stronger objection to Justice
Scalia’s approach is that the evidence-gathering approach lacks doctrinal
justification. Searching to gather evidence during a search incident to arrest
is troubling because it would permit searches based on suspicion—rather than
officer safety—that involve less than probable cause.113 Likewise, such an
approach would offer no justification for permitting searches of the passenger
compartment incident to arrest but not the trunk of the vehicle.114
On the plus side, Justice Scalia’s approach would solve the iPhone
dilemma by reconceptualizing the entire search incident to arrest doctrine,
without requiring a special rule for particular new technology.115 If police
could only search for evidence related to the crime of arrest, most traffic stops
would not permit searches of an iPhone’s contents. And even when police
were permitted to search an iPhone incident to arrest, the scope of the
search would be limited. If an officer arrested a driver for possession of drugs
with intent to distribute, it would make sense to search his text messages for
further evidence of the crime, since that function is commonly used in
conjunction with drug sales.116 But it would not seem to be permissible for
the officer to search through the arrestee’s pictures under the iPhoto function
or the history section under his internet browser because such applications
likely have nothing to do with drug sales. A rule limiting the search incident
to arrest exception to the crime of arrest would prevent police from roaming
at large among the thousands of pages of data held in the iPhone.
112.
See Tomkovicz, supra note 9, at 1451–52 (“It is not hard to imagine at least three of these
Justices endorsing the ‘evidence-gathering’ rationale that Justice Scalia relied upon to sustain the
search in Thornton itself.”).
113.
See David S. Rudstein, Belton Redux: Reevaluating Belton’s Per Se Rule Governing the Search
of an Automobile Incident to Arrest, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1287, 1345–46 (2005); see also Dripps,
supra note 14, at 404 (“The police, incident to arrest, must have some reason—but not probable
cause—to suspect evidence, contraband or weapons. That’s a standard, not a rule, and a fairly vague
standard at that.”); Tomkovicz, supra note 9, at 1464 (“[Justice Scalia] never asserts, because it would
not be defensible to do so, that an arrest for an evidentiary offense will always, or nearly always,
satisfy the constitutional standard—probable cause to believe that an item of interest to the
government will be found in surrounding areas . . . .”). But see Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line
Breaking Point: Embracing Justice Scalia’s Call for the Supreme Court to Abandon an Unreasonable
Approach to Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Law, 82 T UL. L. R EV. 77, 107–08 (2007)
(downplaying this concern).
114.
See Tomkovicz, supra note 9, at 1471 (“Why is it not logical to believe that evidence
located in the arrestee’s vicinity might be found inside her trunk?”).
115.
See Kerr, supra note 7, at 858–59 (cautioning against courts generating new and
individual rules each time new technology raises unforeseen issues).
116.
See, e.g., United States v. Slater, 971 F.2d 626, 637 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that
a cell phone is a “recognized tool of the trade in drug dealing”).
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Change By a Different Sovereign: Encouraging State Legislatures
to Adopt a More Protective Rule

Scholars dispute the ability of state courts to provide greater protection
of constitutional rights than federal courts.117 Although the debate rages, it is
undisputed that, in the criminal procedure context, a number of states have
imposed greater restrictions on searches and seizures under the Fourth
118
Amendment and state constitutional equivalents. Notably, numerous state
courts have cabined the search incident to arrest exception under state law to
narrower circumstances than authorized by the Supreme Court.119
One approach states courts might take is the one advocated by Justice
Scalia and discussed in Part IV.B. If the Supreme Court refuses to limit the
search incident to arrest doctrine to searches of the arrestee for weapons and
evidence of the crime for which he has been arrested, then the state courts
could look to their own constitutions to do so. To date, a handful of state
courts have adopted this approach.120
Moreover, we should look beyond state courts to consider the role of
state legislatures in crafting statutory protections. While new criminal
procedure rules typically come from courts, it would be a mistake to ignore
possible legislative solutions.121 And, indeed, legislatures have taken action in
the past to narrow what they believe to be an overly broad search incident to
arrest doctrine.
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s expansive 1973 decision in United
States v. Robinson122 permitting police to open all containers on a person
117.
The literature on this subject is vast. For two prominent and contrasting viewpoints,
compare James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761
(1992) (documenting the failure of state constitutionalism), with William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (advocating that
state courts can provide greater protection of liberties under state constitutions).
118.
See Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal Procedure: State Constitutional Law
and Selective Disincorporation, 87 J. CRIM. L. & C RIMINOLOGY 63, 92 (1996) (“A good chunk of
Fourth Amendment doctrine, or some more protective variant of it, is now a part of the state
constitutional jurisprudence of most states.”).
119.
See id. at 94 nn.131, 133 (collecting nearly twenty cases from numerous states that limit
the search incident to arrest exception).
120.
See, e.g., State v. Ringer, 674 P.2d 1240 (Wash. 1983) (en banc); State v. Caraher, 653
P.2d 942 (Or. 1982) (en banc).
121.
See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Foreword: Addressing Capital Punishment Through Statutory
Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 10 (2002) (“[W]e turn to legislatures to find some hope within an otherwise
discouraging story about the reform of capital systems . . . .”); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for
Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 223–24 (2004) (arguing
that indigent defense funding is more likely to improve if the reform comes from legislatures rather
than the judiciary).
122.
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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incident to a lawful arrest, the Massachusetts legislature adopted statutory
language specifically designed to narrow the search incident to arrest doctrine.123
For over thirty years, that statute has provided that
[a] search conducted incident to an arrest may be made only for the
purposes of seizing fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and other
evidence of the crime for which the arrest has been made, in order to
prevent its destruction or concealment; and removing any weapons
that the arrestee might use to resist arrest or effect his escape. Property
seized as a result of a search in violation of the provisions of this
124
paragraph shall not be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings.

Other state legislatures could revise their codes to follow the Massachusetts
model. Or those legislatures could take a different approach and authorize
the seizure of iPhones or other wireless devices incident to arrest but prohibit
125
warrantless searches of those devices without a warrant.
The key question is, how likely are legislatures to take action to protect
iPhones from warrantless searches? Legislatures are not typically in the
126
business of limiting police officers’ ability to conduct criminal investigations.
To the contrary, legislators’ interests are typically in line with those of law
enforcement and they therefore enact statutes that favor expansive police
authority.127 Yet, when it comes to iPhones the situation might be different.
Unlike the faceless backdrop in which legislators typically award police great
investigatory powers, the scenarios in which an iPhone can be searched
incident to arrest are likely to resonate with legislators.
As typically middle- or upper-class individuals with teenage or young
adult children, legislators are one of the demographic groups likely to
123.
See Commonwealth v. Madera, 521 N.E.2d 738 (Mass. 1988) (discussing the reason for
passing the statute); Commonwealth v. Toole, 448 N.E.2d 1264 (Mass. 1983) (same).
124.
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 1 (West 2004).
125.
Justice John Paul Stevens has long advocated a similar approach permitting police to
search the passenger compartment of an automobile incident to arrest but not open any of the
containers found therein. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 451–52 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 634 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Rudstein, supra note 113, at 1340–41 (discussing but ultimately rejecting this approach because it
does not eliminate the problem of pretextual arrests).
126.
See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice;
Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079
(1993); see also William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1997) (“Perhaps more so than anywhere else in constitutional law, in
criminal procedure the broad exercise of judicial power tends to be justified precisely by the
legislators’ unwillingness to protect constitutional interests.”).
127.
See Stuntz, supra note 13, at 539 (“[P]olice benefit from laws that criminalize street
behavior that no one wishes actually to punish . . . cheaper policing should be a boon to police and
legislators alike.”).
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purchase iPhones.128 And while legislators rarely commit the crimes of
murder or rape,129 as mostly middle-class white men they are statistically more
likely to be involved in computer crimes such as financial misconduct or
fraud.130 It is evidence of these crimes that is most likely to accidentally turn
up during a search of an iPhone incident to an arrest, whether for running a
stop sign or driving while intoxicated. Moreover, while legislatures are
unlikely to have illegal child pornography on their computers or iPhones, it is
reasonable to assume many male legislators have downloaded “run-of-themill” pornography.131 While this material is not illegal, its discovery would be
132
embarrassing and politically devastating.
And as Professor Craig Lerner has demonstrated, significant legislative
protections for criminal defendants often arises in response to a particular
legislator being put through the criminal justice process.133 Thus, while
legislators are tough on crime and reluctant to reduce punishments or remove
old crimes from the books, it is reasonable to expect that legislators will
create criminal procedure protections that track their own self-interest.134

128.
At least at this time, it is likely that legislators’ children are the primary demographic
group that Apple and its competitors are targeting. See Devona Walker, In Southwest Florida, Apple
Geeks Aren’t Sold, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., June 27, 2007, at D1 (“[T]he iPhone’s ideal
demographic: a young, professional, tech-savvy gadget kind of guy who came into adulthood with an
affinity for everything Apple.”). As the devices become more ubiquitous however, middle-aged men
and women will increasingly own them personally rather than purchasing them as gifts for children.
129.
See Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes)
Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 622–23 (2004) (explaining that most
indictments of federal legislators have been for nonviolent offenses, particularly financial crimes).
130.
See id. at 623–24 (explaining that in addition to financial crimes, between 1970 and 2000
“six members of Congress were indicted for sex-related offenses, and several others have been
investigated by their colleagues for sexual improprieties”).
131.
See Meghan Daum, Porn’s Lost Sex Appeal, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2007, at A19 (“[N]umbers
suggest that 20% of men and 13% of women look at pornography at work . . . .”).
132.
See Alan Bernstein, County GOP Nervous About Fallout From Email Scandal—Two Republicans
Hoping to Replace DA Say a Housekeeping Is Needed to Return Integrity to the Office, HOUSTON
CHRON., Jan. 10, 2008, at B1 (describing the uproar when pornography was found on the office
computer of the elected District Attorney of Harris County); see also Scott Glover, The U.S. 3rd
Circuit Names a Special Panel to Investigate Possible Misconduct of Federal Jurist Alex Kozinski, L.A.
TIMES, June 17, 2008, at 1 (describing how Judge Alex Kozinski declared a mistrial in an obscenity
trial he was presiding over and called for an investigation of himself following the disclosure that
sexually explicit material was posted on his personal website).
133.
See Lerner, supra note 129, at 632–61. For a recent and excellent argument challenging
the view that criminal legislation tends to be entirely one-directional and that legislators never
decriminalize conduct, see Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223,
265–74 (2007).
134.
See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781,
796 (2006) (“[L]egislatures have been a good deal quicker to expand criminal procedure protections
than to contract criminal liability.”).
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It is therefore possible that legislators will enact laws limiting the
search of iPhones incident to arrest.
Moreover, legislators have incentive to enact such restrictions to please
constituents. While it is unlikely that a lobby will form to press for a law
exempting iPhones from the search incident to arrest doctrine, it is entirely
possible that in the near future a prominent business executive or other
powerful and connected individual will be embarrassed when his iPhone
is searched at a traffic stop. And when those middle- and upper-class
individuals—the type who vote and, more importantly, have money to make
campaign contributions—press for some legislative action, lawmakers will
have little reason to refuse them. The soft-on-crime label tends not to stick
when the new law benefits a considerable majority and protects the middleclass right to privacy.135
D.

Change at the Margins: The Open Application Test

A more modest revision to the search incident to arrest doctrine, but
one that nevertheless would eliminate the current bright-line rule, would be
for courts to adopt an open application test. Under an open application
approach, police would be permitted to search any open application on the
iPhone incident to arrest but would not be authorized to look through
applications that are closed when the arrest is made. Thus, an individual who
took steps to close the iPhoto application could expect the pictures contained
therein to remain private. More significantly, an individual who kept her
iPhone off entirely could avoid any search of its contents.
There are at least two problems with this approach: First, it would be
very difficult to know if officers are telling the truth when they say an
application was open. Because an iPhone can be turned on simply by tapping
the touch screen and applications can be activated simply by touching an
icon, it would be easy for officers to testify that an application was open at the
time of arrest, even if it was in fact closed.136 Of course, the prospect of police
135.
See Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
9, 16 (1999) (“[T]he conclusion that crime policy has shifted toward a ‘get tough’ strategy needs to be
tempered with the recognition that when the perceived offenders are white and/or middle class,
policymakers appear to be more receptive to rational policy considerations.”).
136.
Unfortunately, many experts believe that officers lie or, at best, fudge facts to ensure that
guilty defendants are convicted. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do
About It, 67 U. C OLO. L. R EV . 1037, 1041 (1996) (“[T]he existing literature demonstrates a
widespread belief that testilying is a frequent occurrence . . . .”); Myron R. Orfield, The Exclusionary
Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1050
(1987) (concluding that more than 75 percent of officers surveyed believed that police shade the
facts regarding probable cause, and that 19 percent of those who so believed also believed perjury was
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lying runs throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Police could just as
easily lie and say they received consent to search the trunk of a vehicle when
they in fact did not, or that they smelled marijuana when in fact there was no
such smell.
A second and more compelling reason to reject the open application
test is that it runs afoul of one of the original justifications for the search
incident to arrest doctrine: preventing the destruction of evidence.137 Just as
police could quickly open a closed application on the iPhone, so too could a
suspect. An arrestee skilled at using his iPhone might be able to turn on the
device, select an application, and destroy text messages, emails, photos, or
other evidence in a matter of seconds.
Given that the Supreme Court has adopted a fiction that almost any
physical evidence—whether in a closed or open container—in the arrestee’s
grasp could potentially be destroyed (even if the arrestee is handcuffed138) it
would make little sense to draw a line forbidding searches of closed applications
on an electronic device that an arrestee could easily open and destroy.139
E.

Changing the Bright-Line Rule: Limiting the Search Incident
to Arrest Doctrine to Five Steps of Searches

Another solution would be to limit police to only a fixed number of
steps when searching the contents of an iPhone incident to arrest. For
instance, courts could set a bright-line rule that police can take five steps, but
no more, when rummaging through an iPhone’s contents. As with the open
application test, this solution likely causes more problems than it would solve,
but is worth exploring briefly.
The primary virtue of the search incident to arrest doctrine is that it
provides bright-line rules that are easily understood and applied. Thus, police
reasonably common). For the classic statement, see ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE, at
xxi (1982) (“Almost all police lie about whether they violated the Constitution in order to convict
guilty defendants.”).
137.
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (“[I]t is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction.”).
138.
See Carol A. Chase, Cars, Cops, and Crooks: A Reexamination of Belton and Carroll With an
Eye Toward Restoring Fourth Amendment Privacy Protection to Automobiles, 85 OR. L. REV. 913, 918
n.31 (2006) (“Several courts have approved the search incident to arrest of an automobile
notwithstanding that the suspect has been handcuffed and placed inside a police cruiser.”).
139.
See Tomkovicz, supra note 9, at 1427 (explaining that while the pre-Chimel era was
marked by drastic changes in the scope of the search incident to arrest doctrine, “during the more
than thirty-five years since its radical, contractive swing in Chimel, the search incident pendulum has
moved slowly, yet steadily, in the opposite direction”).

The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment

55

know that they can open an arrestee’s wallet but cannot search the trunk of
his car. The primary detriment of the search incident to arrest doctrine is
that it permits the police to rummage through numerous layers of enclosed
materials, even if there is no probable cause to believe contraband is buried
beneath. This problem is particularly vexing with respect to the iPhone
because it contains layer upon layer of data. As previously discussed, police
conceivably could (1) turn on the phone; (2) open an internet browser;
(3) type in a web-based email account such as www.hotmail.com; (4) log
into the account (if the user id and password are saved); (5) open a folder
of messages; (6) open a particular message; (7) read the message; (8) open the
attachment to the message; and so forth.
One compromise approach would be to create a bright-line “five-level
deep” rule (or some other admittedly arbitrary number) limiting the search of
iPhones to a total of five steps. Under such a rule, the police could search
five levels deep into an iPhone’s contents, but no further. Thus, for example,
police could (1) turn on the phone; (2) open the internet browser; (3) type in
a web-based email account such as www.hotmail.com; (4) log into the
account (if the user id and password are saved); and (5) open a folder of
messages. If the officer completes the fifth step without finding anything
incriminating that could be destroyed, the officer would need to stop
searching. To search further, the officer would need to procure a warrant.140
The main virtue to this approach is that it puts an outer limit on how far
police may search electronic data while at the same time leaving intact a
relatively bright-line rule that makes clear to police exactly how far they can
go. On the other hand, whether police exceeded the five steps would
certainly be debated in individual cases. Judges would have to make findings
of fact ranging from the simple—whether the phone was already turned on
when the search incident to arrest began, thus not counting as one of the five
steps—to the more fuzzy inquiries. For instance, when police linked from one
webpage to another, were they taking two steps, or just one? This sort of
unguided fact-finding is exactly what courts have tried to avoid by advocating
a bright-line search incident to arrest rule.
Perhaps more obviously troubling, selecting a certain number of
searches—for instance, saying that police can search five levels deep into an
iPhone, but not six—is terribly arbitrary. While courts could say the number
of levels is correlated to the likelihood that the arrestee could reach that data
and destroy it, selecting a level would still be beyond the institutional
140.
Of course, a warrant would require probable cause, which is unlikely to be shown given
the lack of any incriminating evidence found thus far in the search.
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capacity of courts.141 Moreover, no comparable five-step rule exists for
searches of tangible evidence found during a typical search incident to arrest.
If police can exceed five steps to discover drugs in a small bag hidden inside a
box lying under some papers in the glove compartment of a car, it is difficult
to justify a five-step rule only for iPhones.
F.

Distinguishing Between Data on the Device and Remotely-Stored Data
Accessible From the Device

Finally, courts could try to draw a conceptual line between data that is
“on” or “in” the iPhone and data that is simply accessible via the iPhone.
This would essentially be drawing a line between the iPhone’s internet
browser function and its other applications. An arrestee’s pictures in his
iPhoto application, his text messages, and his incoming call history would be
considered contained “in” the phone. If internet service were cut off, the
owner of the phone would still be able to access these features because the data
has been downloaded to the phone. By contrast, web-based email accounts or
other material that an individual accesses over the internet are not typically
downloaded to the phone and are instead, for lack of a better phrase, simply
floating around on electronic servers in cyberspace. Because such data is not
physically present on the iPhone without proactively seeking it out, courts
and legislatures could draw a line forbidding such searches incident to arrest
while allowing police to search applications that have data permanently on
the iPhone.
One wrinkle to this approach might be if the internet browser that
allows the user to access information floating in cyberspace is open when the
officer searches the iPhone. For instance, what if the officer conducting
the search incident to arrest discovers that the internet browser is open to a
web-based email account and the selected email has incriminating information
in it? Surely it would not make sense to say that the officer could search the
rest of the iPhone’s applications but not the open web-based email. One
solution to this problem would be to harken back to the original search
incident to arrest jurisprudence that allows a full-scale search of some areas
beyond the person of the arrestee if the area is in the immediate grabbing
space.142 For instance, the search incident to arrest doctrine typically does not
allow a search of the trunk of a vehicle, but if the trunk is open and the

141.
142.

See Kerr, supra note 7, at 858–59.
See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
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arrestee is standing near it, then such a search is permissible.143 In the
hypothetical scenario outlined above, web-based email can be analogized to
the trunk of a car. The web-based email, banking information, or MySpace
page, would typically be considered to be outside the grabbing space of the
suspect. However, when the webpage is open in the internet browser at
the time of arrest it would be within the arrestee’s immediate grabbing space.
Thinking in terms of physical tangible space, an approach that differentiates
between material downloaded onto the iPhone and material that is simply
accessible via the iPhone seems to make sense. Just as officers could search
the cigarette pack in Mr. Robinson’s pocket, they can also search the photos
he is carrying on his iPhone. And just as the police could not search Mr.
Robinson’s medical records stored in his house (rather than on his person),
the police also could not search electronic data not currently downloaded
onto his phone.
Yet, the comparison with Robinson’s medical records fails at a certain
level when we consider that one purpose of the search incident to arrest
doctrine is to prevent destruction of evidence. Of course, Mr. Robinson
could not destroy the medical records in his house while being arrested at a
traffic stop. Yet, he could quickly open his internet browser, log onto his
web-based email account, and destroy incriminating evidence without ever
leaving the traffic stop. Nevertheless, this approach is conceptually promising
because it does not require a wholesale revision of the search incident to arrest
doctrine, which has been framed with tangible physical evidence in mind.

CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, all six approaches appear to be somewhat
unsatisfying. Permitting the police to search only for evidence related to
the purpose of arrest would improve the doctrine for all cases, not just those
involving iPhones, but it has recently been rejected by a majority of the Supreme
Court. Asking state legislatures to limit police to search incident to arrest
only for evidence related to the arrest is plausible, but highly unlikely to
occur in many states. An open application test may encourage police
deception and will likely create the types of factual disputes that the brightline search incident to arrest doctrine was designed to avoid. A five-step
limit will likewise raise factual questions that are best avoided. Finally, while
143.
See, e.g., State v. Alderman, No. 28991-1-II, 2003 WL 21965127, at *3 (Wash. App.
Aug. 19, 2003) (upholding the search of a vehicle’s trunk that was “partially open” under the search
incident to arrest doctrine).
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a rule that differentiates between data on the iPhone and data accessible via
the phone is the most conceptually pure, it does not account for the possibility
that arrestees could still destroy data that is merely accessible via the iPhone.
Nevertheless, despite the flaws associated with each proposal, all are likely
preferable to doing nothing and allowing police to search thousands of pages
of electronic data without probable cause or a warrant.

